Thursday, February 5, 2015

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM Declassified RecordsTrace U.S. Monitoring and Analyses of a Critical Area of Cold WarCompetition

Washington, DC, February 4, 2015 – During much of the Cold War Soviet space activities — civilian and military — were a major focus of U.S. intelligence collection and analysis. As one of the key areas of technological competition with Moscow — one where the Soviet Union jumped to an early lead in some space activities — the space race generated profound concern in Washington over the need to understand and respond to new developments. To that end, U.S. analysts resorted to the full-spectrum of intelligence techniques — from assorted forms of technical collection to scrutinizing Soviet documentary films on the flights of Yuri Gagarin and Gherman Titov (to obtain data on the USSR's closely guarded manned space launch facilities). 
Today, the National Security Archive posts a compilation of over 50 documents concerning U.S. intelligence collection and analysis on the Soviet space program from its earliest years to just before the Soviet collapse. This briefing book supplements an earlier Archive posting that concerned, in part, U.S. intelligence and Soviet lunar activities. Today's posting includes National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet space program from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s — estimates that covered Soviet earth satellites (particularly those with military applications), lunar-related activities, and probes to Mars and Venus. 
More recent analytical documents in the posting deal with the Soviet space program in the Gorbachev era. They include a 1986 CIA assessment of Soviet military and space systems in development and their implications for improving Soviet capabilities in the 1990s, a possible Soviet manned Mars landing mission, and the Soviet sale of satellite images on the commercial market — a revealing reversal of Moscow's longstanding policy of hiding the activities of its spy satellites. 
Specifically, the documents:
  • Discuss the U.S. ability to detect the camera events associated with Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellite missions (Document 23).
  • Examine the 21-year search for a Soviet deep space signal and the role of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) effort in resolving the mystery (Document 28Document 40Document 49).
  • Provide a history of the role of U.S. SIGINT facilities, particularly the STONEHOUSE system in Ethiopia, in monitoring the Soviet space program (Document 21Document 30).
  • Reveal the evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community's understanding of the status of key Soviet military space programs — including photographic reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, early warning, and ocean surveillance programs. 
  • Reveal information about the Soviet directed energy anti-satellite (ASAT) program and Soviet vulnerability to the U.S. projected U.S. ASAT system
  • Provide assessments at various points in time concerning actual or possible other Soviet space activities — including plans for lunar and Mars landings, and the orbiting of nuclear weapons. 
  • Discuss developments in the early 1990s, specifically the growth in capability of Soviet space transportation systems, which the CIA rightly predicted would prompt Moscow to seek economic benefits through trade and technological cooperation with the West (Document 47). 

* * *

U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

By Jeffrey T. Richelson


A Soviet technician works on Sputnik, the earth's first artificial satellite. (NASA/Asif A. Siddiqi)
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, which became the earth's first artificial satellite — and represented a significant propaganda victory for the Communist state. In the United States, some prominent scientists and politicians reacted with alarm. Edward Teller, the co-developer of the hydrogen bomb, declared on national television that the United States had lost "a battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor." Senator Henry Jackson of Washington called the launch "a devastating blow to the prestige of the United States," while Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri called Sputnik "proof of growing Communist superiority in the all important missile field."1
Soviet missile and space activities had already been the subject of numerous intelligence products by the CIA and other organizations — some extremely speculative given the limited intelligence sources and, in some cases, limited Soviet activities in those fields. But as the Soviet Union's activity in space expanded, the U.S. Intelligence Community focused increased attention and resources on its space effort — whether military or scientific; whether they involved earth satellites, lunar missions, or planetary probes. As a future head of the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence and a senior analyst wrote in a 1961 article (Document 3) in the CIA journal, Studies in Intelligence: "our stature as a nation, our culture, our way of life and government are tending to be gauged by our skill in [the space race]."
The concern with all aspects of the space race with the Soviet Union led, over the years, to the production of a large number of intelligence products or descriptions of U.S. intelligence activity directed at the Soviet space program, which reflected both the diversity of collection activities and the range of targets concerning that program — some in space and others on the ground. Those products would have an impact in a number of areas — from operational security for classified U.S. activities (such as those at Area 51), to planning intelligence collection against Soviet space activities, to helping NASA understand both where it stood in the race to the Moon and the status of Soviet efforts to send spacecraft to Mars and Venus, and to publicizing Soviet space failures. (Document 4).2

National Intelligence Estimates


Statue of Yuri Gagarin, the first human being to fly in space, in Karaganda, Kazakhstan. (NASA)
On December 5, 1962, the Director of Central Intelligence published the first of a series of specially focused National Intelligence Estimates (Document 5), titled The Soviet Space Program. The initial estimate covered five topics — aims and achievements to date, Soviet space flight programs, supporting scientific and technical capabilities, future objectives and capabilities, and probable magnitude of the Soviet effort. 
Subsequent estimates with the same title (or minor variations) followed in 1965 (Document 11), 1967 (Document 14a), 1969 (Document 16a), 1971 (Document 18), 1973 (Document 20), 1983 (Document 38a), and 1985 (Document 42). The estimates focused on ground facilities, launch vehicles, space systems (particularly military systems), lunar activities, scientific and technical capabilities, and planetary probes. Those estimates reflected both the growing Soviet space program and increasing U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor and understand such activities. Thus, the 1969 estimate (Document 16a) noted that "Soviet ELINT satellites are more clearly understood than in previous years."
In addition to electronic intelligence satellites, Soviet space capabilities of particular concern to the United States that were reflected in the estimates included launches of Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellites, the development of electronic and radar reconnaissance satellites for ocean surveillance, the deployment of satellites that could detect missile launches, the development of a near-real-time electro-optical satellite, and the possible use of scientific satellites to detect nuclear detonations.
In other cases, NIEs treated more specialized subjects with regard to Soviet space activities — such as the July 1963 NIE, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons (Document 6). This estimate examined possible launch systems, warhead yields and effects, and cost considerations, covering the period 1963-1964 as well as 1965-1970. Its primary conclusion was that the Intelligence Community had "acquired no evidence that the USSR plans to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite in the near term, or that a program to establish an orbital bombardment capability is at present seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership."

Ground Facilities

The NIEs were built on a variety of earlier reports which focused on specific elements of Soviet space activity. Included among them were reports on several ground facilities with different missions. A 1980 report (Document 31) by the CIA-run National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), reflecting the reliance on satellite imagery (although additional information was provided by communications intelligence), described developments at six Soviet space-related research institutes.

A map of the Soviet launch complex commonly known as Baikonur. Named after a small mining town in Kazakhstan, the complex was actually closer to the town of Tyuratam. The Soviets wanted to obscure its true location for security reasons. (NASA)
Another focus of photographic satellite coverage of the Soviet space program was the program's electronic tracking facilities. Thus, a 1964 NPIC report (Document 8) provided intelligence on the Simferopol earth satellite tracking and communication center, described as "probably the most important station in the USSR for tracking near-space objects." The next year, the CIA's Imagery Analysis Division produced a study (Document 12) on space-related high-power tracking facilities at three launch centers — Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar, and Plesetsk. 
Activities at those centers, including launch vehicles waiting on their pads and actual launches (successes as well as failures) were also a key target — as often reflected in national estimates. The most common methods for gathering data on launch sites, launch vehicles and launches were satellite imagery, communications intelligence, and radar systems (in locations such as Turkey and Iran). But NPIC also could find utility in a drastically different form of imagery than that obtained by U.S. overhead sources — as it did in 1963 when it produced an analysis (Document 7) of Soviet manned space flight launch facilities — specifically at Tyuratam — using the contents of two Soviet documentary films on the flights of Yuri Gagarin and Gherman Titov. 

Cosmos Missions

Many Soviet space missions were assigned the designation of Cosmos, in an attempt to obscure their purpose, although orbital parameters and launch sites provided significant mission information to intelligence analysts. An article in the CIA's Studies in Intelligence(Document 17) discussed how analysts were also able to employ the specifics of the Soviet Union's own announcements to determine spacecraft missions. The author concluded by posing (but not answering) the question why Soviets "have clung to formulae which ... are after all not very secure."
One mission that proved difficult for analysts to understand, despite such clues, was the Cosmos 57 flight of February 12, 1965. Another account in Studies in Intelligence (Document 13) explained how analysts — employing radar data and telemetry intelligence — were eventually able to determine that the mission was a test of an automated system that operated the airlock a cosmonaut needed to pass through to conduct a spacewalk. Over twenty-years later another Cosmos mission — 954 — would become a major focus of those in the Intelligence Community and military who monitored and analyzed Soviet space operations. The concern was not determining its objective — conducting ocean surveillance — but where parts of the satellite (equipped with a nuclear reactor and known to be ailing) would crash into the earth's surface. (The remains of the spacecraft landed in Canada's Northwest Territories in late January 1977.) An account of the U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and other efforts concerning Cosmos 954 appeared in another Studies in Intelligence article (Document 25).
The crash on the territory of an American ally meant that the U.S. could examine debris from the spacecraft rather than relying solely on remotely collected data. One product of the materiel exploitation effort was an analysis (Document 26) conducted at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, which focused on the fuel employed by the spacecraft's reactor.
A particularly revealing account of one Cosmos mission was published several years earlier in a classified DIA publication (Document 23). It concerned Cosmos 779, whose targets included several located in Angola. The DIA account indicated that the U.S. was capable of monitoring more than just the launch and movements of Soviet spacecraft on orbit — such as maneuvering to lower an orbit to obtain a better photograph of a target. The document reported, inter alia, that "Since 7 September, the Soviets have conducted at least 10 camera events in Angola" and that there was an area in southeastern Angola that "has been photographed at least four times since 20 April." The implication of this information is that the United States was capable of determining when Cosmos 779 actually took photographs and of its targets.

SIGINT Support

As illustrated by some of the documents in this posting, monitoring the Soviet space program involved the full-range of U.S. intelligence capabilities — overhead photography, open sources, radar intelligence, and signals intelligence. 
One component of the SIGINT effort was an antenna located at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, codenamed STONEHOUSE, that operated from 1965 to 1975. Its targets included the Luna 9 mission, and a variety of other Soviet space missions, including a planetary probe that orbited Venus. An article in the NSA's Cryptologic Spectrum (Document 21) provides a brief history of the STONEHOUSE effort.
The broader SIGINT effort to support space surveillance is described in an NSA cryptologic history (Document 30), which covers the background of the program, NSA's planning and organizing to reform the space surveillance SIGINT mission, constructing and equipping the stations (including STONEHOUSE ), and the "completion and certain lessons of experience."
Some of the material redacted from the released history is filled in by one article reporting on that partially declassified history. The article reports that in addition to the STONEHOUSE antenna at Kagnew there was a second antenna system designated BAYHOUSE. Other signals intelligence facilities (operated by NSA or its service cryptological elements) used to monitor the Soviet space program were located at Peshawar, Pakistan (BANKHEAD I); Chitose, Japan (BANKHEAD II), Sinop, Turkey (BANKHEAD III), and CODHOOK in central Norway. Among CODHOOK's targets were what was believed to be the test of a fractional orbit bombardment systems as well as the Soviet's 1968 test of an anti-satellite system.3

ASAT

The value of space systems to both the United States and Soviet Union resulted in each nation being concerned about the consequences of the failure of such systems. In addition to chance satellite failures there was concern about active measures taken to destroy satellites or prevent them from functioning properly. Such measures could include interference, jamming, meaconing (sending false signals), or a physical assault on the satellites — launched from ground, air, or space. Both nations conducted significant experimental efforts with regard to anti-satellite (ASAT) systems and monitored the other's efforts — one example of U.S. monitoring being the targeting, noted above, of the CODHOOK system in 1968. 
The full range of Soviet ASAT efforts was discussed in various National Intelligence Estimates and other assessments. A 1978 assessment (Document 27) conducted by the Air Force Systems Command Foreign Technology Division focused on Soviet directed energy ASAT capabilities. It examined the Soviet Union's' directed energy ASAT system capability, Soviet directed energy ASAT technology capabilities, and satellite damage and vulnerability from laser or neutral particle beams. The assessment concluded that "The Soviets have demonstrated a well funded directed energy (DE) program and it is probable that ASAT applications will be among the earliest missions considered."
Five years later, the CIA examined (Document 39) the Soviet ability to defend its satellites against the U.S. ASAT system in development — the air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV) that was scheduled to be deployed in 1987. CIA analysts believed that the Soviets would have "only a limited capability to defend their satellites against an attack" by the ALMV. As a result, the U.S. system, if deployed, would be capable of "attacking low-altitude satellites, including most of the Soviet reconnaissance satellites."

Military Support Systems

While the Soviet space NIEs generally discussed above covered the whole range of Soviet space programs, other Intelligence Community or DoD products focused specifically on military space programs.
A 1975 Interagency Intelligence Assessment (Document 22) dealt with Soviet dependence on key military space systems — including reconnaissance/surveillance, communications, and other systems. Among the topics explored in addition to Soviet dependence on those systems was the degradation in Soviet military capabilities if systems were not available. The assessment also examined Soviet defense of their space systems as well as the prospects for interfering with U.S. systems. 
In 1980, an NIE in the 11-1 series departed from the usual examination of the full spectrum of Soviet space systems and focused on Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space (Document 33). The estimate examines existing and prospective military support space systems, existing and prospective uses of space systems for intelligence and military support, and existing and prospective use of space systems to negate those of other nations.
Five years later, the Defense Intelligence Agency published a study performed by the Foreign Technology Division (Document 41) which examined the Soviet use of space for military purposes. It focused on Soviet intentions in space, the Soviet space order of battle, future Soviet space systems military employment, and current Soviet spacecraft operational capabilities. The main topic of the section on military employment of space systems is the use of space systems to support different components of the Soviet defense establishment — including the Supreme High Command and the Strategic Rocket Forces. 

The 21-Year Search


SETI's Alien Telescope Array (SETI).
A 1978 article in Studies in Intelligence (Document 28) reported that "for nearly sixteen years the Soviet Union has been using a deep-space link that we have been able to intercept." The author, James D. Burke, went on to describe U.S. intelligence efforts that led first "to a conviction that the link exists," second "to a knowledge of many other aspects of the Soviet planetary program," and finally, "to a determined but still unsuccessful effort to find the unknown signal."
The article, with only a few redactions (which concerned the location of intercept sites other than the STONEHOUSE site in Ethiopia), examined deep-space information systems, Soviet deep-space communications, early U.S. deep-space collection efforts, clues, narrowing of the search, and future efforts. Burke noted that "the whole problem is more an annoyance than a crisis. Soviet planetary results have seldom been of primary importance to the United States." However, he also wrote that the search was an "exercise of techniques that have other uses" and that "should it turn out that the Soviets have been deliberately hiding the signal by any of several possible spread-spectrum or suppressed-carrier techniques, we will have learned something important."
Six years later Burke reported (Document 40) that the mystery had been solved the year before, when on "9 November 1983 ... [t]wo Soviet spacecraft in orbit around the planet Venus on that day began transmitting at five-centimeter wavelength and for the first time we intercepted the signal." Far more heavily redacted than his 1978 article, Burke's later article covered the nature of the search, intelligence priorities, the 1983 Venus mission, and the aftermath. Also included was a partially redacted section concerning the contribution that came from SETI [Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence] researchers and a wholly deleted section titled "epiphany."
Almost twenty-years after Burke's second article on the search, the NSA's Cryptologic Almanac published an article (Document 49) by NSA historian Robert Hanyok that provides additional information to that contained in Burke's second piece (Document 40). It disclosed that the U.S. intercept stations only had a "short window" to intercept the signal being sent to the Soviet's Crimea control station and the CIA had tried to assist in discovery of the signal's frequency by sending hardware specialists to visit displays of Soviet satellites at international space expositions in Paris and Los Angeles.
The article also provided more information on the specific SETI equipment employed in the search effort - a Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) van that "could monitor 64,000 radio channels ... simultaneously." The article also reported that the van (which was flown to a new location) and other collection assets were coordinated by the joint NSA-DIA Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) and that shortly after midnight on November 9, 1983, a teletypewriter at DEFSMAC spit out a message that began: "We have it."

The Last Years

While the ascendance of Mikhail Gorbachev to the role of general secretary in 1985 produced a significant change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, Soviet space programs remained a subject of U.S. intelligence collection and analysis.
In 1986, the CIA produced an assessment (Document 43) on Soviet military and space systems in development and their implications for improving Soviet capabilities in the 1990s. It reported that that as of January 1, 1986, "the Soviets have at least 123 military systems in development, most of which will achieve initial operational capability by the mid-1990s." The bulk of the paper focuses on Soviet military capabilities that would be supported by space activities, with a final section on military applications of space.
Two years later, CIA analysts returned to a subject that had concerned them in the early years of the Soviet space program — although with more urgency. A January 1988 paper (Document 44), Soviet Scientific Space Program: Gaining Prestige, examined four projected Soviet scientific space missions — astronomy, lunar and planetary, solar-terrestrial physics, and biomedical — and their role in gaining international prestige for the Soviet space program. 
In September 1988, the agency produced a study (Document 45) of the Soviets' reusable space systems programs. The assessment focused on two reusable space systems and their prospects — a space shuttle and a spaceplane. For both systems, the assessment, inter alia, examines their possible role in military operations. A space shuttle's "lack of orbital maneuverability and the time required for prelaunch checkout limit its usefulness for most potential intelligence collection and combat missions," was the judgment of the assessment. In contrast, "a spaceplane's maneuvering capability, both in space and in the atmosphere, could provide the Soviet Air Force with a highly maneuverable, manned spacecraft to conduct military operations." It could serve as a "rapid reaction reconnaissance vehicle."
The next year, another CIA study (Document 46) directed attention to a possible Soviet program with no military significance — a manned Mars landing mission. A key judgment of this assessment was that "the Soviets are planning for a manned Mars landing mission sometime after the year 2000" — although the mission had not been officially funded. The assessment went on to examine planning for a manned Mars mission, mission requirements, Soviet investment, cooperation with the United States on a Mars mission, and future indicators of a Soviet mission. 
One study (Document 47), produced by the CIA in 1990, that certainly reflected the change in Soviet policies as well as the Soviet Union's precarious economic position focused on the Soviet sale of images — with greater resolution than anything then commercially available — produced by some of the nation's spy satellites. This represented a dramatic contrast from the early years of the space race when the Soviets tried to obscure the fact that certain satellites were engaging in photographic reconnaissance — and U.S. analysts sifted through intelligence data and Soviet announcements (Document 17) to determine a satellite's mission.
The next year, the agency produced Assessment of Soviet Space Transportation Technology (Document 48)which noted that "the primary strength of the Soviet space program is its space transportation systems" and that as a result of its deteriorating economic situation "there is enormous incentive for the Soviets to sell existing systems to the West and seek Western partners for jointly developing future systems." It went on to examine Soviet capabilities with regard to seven different components of space transportation technology.


DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

Document 1: [Author's Name Deleted], "Signals from Outer Space," NSA Technical Journal, III, 2 (April 1958). Secret. 
Source: www.nsa.gov
This article disputes the "general assumption" that the radio signals from Sputniks I and II "must contain the greater part of the intelligence to be acquired from such space satellites." It "attempts to point out methods of data acquisition by other than telemetry techniques."

Document 2: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Space Research Program, Monograph IV: Space Vehicles, February 26, 1960. Classification Not Available.
Source: Editor's Collection
This study focuses on five topics related to Soviet space vehicles: satellites and space probes, launch vehicles, construction materials and fabrication technology, the radiation shielding problem, vertically fired high-altitude space research vehicles, as well as re-entry capsules and winged space vehicles.

Document 3: Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal, "Intelligence for the Space Race," Studies in Intelligence, 5, 4 (Fall 1961). Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This article, co-authored by the future head of the CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) and Directorate of Science and Technology (Albert Wheelon) and an OSI analyst, characterized the space race as a game and noted that "our stature as a nation, our culture, our way of life and government are tending to be gauged by our skill in playing this game." It goes on to identify the requirements for intelligence collection and analysis in order to support U.S. leaders in competing in the space race.

Document 4: Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Publicity on Failures of Soviet Space Probes, September 5, 1962, w/att: Comments on Soviet Attempts to Send Spacecraft to Mars and Venus. Secret.
Source: CREST
This memo to President Kennedy from John McCone's deputy contained an attached fact sheet which provided details on Soviet failures relating to its attempt to send probes to Mars and Venus. In his covering memo, Marshall Carter notes that the information will be "used obliquely by NASA," and that while the fact sheet could be declassified due to available "collateral" information, there was concern that publication would result in the "opening up of this entire matter of our knowledge of Soviet activities to the general scrutiny of the public, and particularly the probing press."

Document 5: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate, The Soviet Space Program, December 5, 1962. Classification Not Available.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This NIE was apparently the first devoted solely to the Soviet space program. It covers five topics: aims and achievements to date, Soviet space flight programs, supporting scientific and technical capabilities, future objectives and capabilities, and the probable magnitude of the Soviet effort. The section on spaceflight programs includes discussions of lunar exploration, planetary probes (heavily redacted), man-in-space activities, and the Cosmos series. The future objectives and capabilities section devotes considerable attention to Soviet interest in a manned lunar landing, man-in-space programs, and military goals.

Document 6: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-9-63, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons, July 15, 1963. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
Prior to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, there was no legal prohibition to a nation placing nuclear weapons in orbit. This estimate focuses on Soviet capabilities to orbit such a weapon during 1963-1964 (specifically: available launch systems, warhead yields and effects, and cost considerations), the likelihood during 1963-1964, reactions to specific UN and US courses of action, and Soviet capabilities during the 1965-1970 period. The first conclusion of the estimate is that "we have thus far acquired no evidence that the USSR plans to orbit a nuclear-armed satellite in the near term, or that a program to establish an orbital bombardment capability is at present seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership."

Document 7: National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, NPIC/R-1567/63, Analysis of Soviet Manned Space Flight Launch Facilities, December 1963. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This analysis, rather than being based on overhead photography obtained by U-2 or satellite reconnaissance missions, focuses on the content of two Soviet documentary films — First Voyage to the Stars and Again to the Stars —on the flights of Yuri Gagarin and Gherman Titov. It seeks to provide a detailed description of facilities at the Tyuratam Missile Test Range.

Document 8: National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, NPIC/R-69/64, Earth Satellite Tracking and Communication Center. Simferopol, USSR, February 1964. Top Secret .
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
Along with launch sites, earth tracking and communication centers represented another ground-based component of the Soviet space program. Based at least in part on satellite photography, this report concerns what was described as "probably the most important station in the USSR for tracking near-space orbiting objects." It seeks to identify each component of the center — from fences to the telemetry collection site. Sections focus on the radio astronomy station, a probable satellite telemetry collection site, the presence of a FLIM FLAM tracking station, terrestrial communications facilities, and the support area.

Document 9: Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, Subject: The Soviet Reconnaissance Satellite Program, June 18, 1964. Secret.
Source: Gerald K. Haines, and Robert E. Leggett, CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001).
The Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellite program was a significant subject of collection and analysis by the CIA and other components of the U.S. Intelligence Community because it had implications for U.S. operational security requirements, assessments of Soviet intelligence capabilities, and evaluations of Soviet space support to its military forces. This short memo provides an assessment of the status of the Soviet satellite reconnaissance program, which it characterizes as appearing "to be well under way with possibly as many as 12 flights since 1962." The memo states that "we believe that the USSR has made this large investment primarily for missile targeting purposes."

Document 10: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, New Space Facilities at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center, October 14, 1964. Top Secret Codeword.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This study, based on Soviet documentary films (Document 7), overhead photography, and signals intelligence, describes the results of photographic coverage of four Tyuratam launch complexes, assesses space program status and possible booster options, and includes a facilities analysis. 

Document 11: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-65, The Soviet Space Program, January 27, 1965, Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This NIE supersedes the 1962 estimate on the Soviet space program, and reflects both increased U.S. intelligence capabilities and additional Soviet space activities. The body of the estimate concerns the Soviet space record (including lunar and planetary probes, manned space flight, and strategic reconnaissance), factors affecting future prospects, and the outlook for the program. Its annexes include summaries of Soviet space launchings through 1964, the principal types of vehicles and techniques employed in Soviet space projects, and an assortment of additional topics (in annex C).

Document 12: Imagery Analysis Division, Central Intelligence Agency, Space-Related High-Power Tracking Facilities, Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar, and Plesetsk, USSR, October 1965, Top Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
This report resulted from the identification of "three unusual electronic facilities" in the USSR. The facilities were characterized as "large sophisticated tracking facilities, which could be capable of supporting Soviet space flights." The report notes that construction of two antennas were begun during the first quarter of 1965 at the Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar test centers while construction at Plesetsk began during the third quarter of 1965. It provides a technical description of each antenna.

Document 13: Frank W. Whitmire and Edward G. Correll, "The Failure of Cosmos 57," Studies in Intelligence , 10, 3 (Summer 1966). 
Source: Editor's Collection.
This article describes how CIA analysts, employing radar data and telemetry intelligence, unraveled the purpose of the failed Cosmos 57 mission of February 12, 1965. They were able to determine that the mission was a test of an automated system that operated the airlock a cosmonaut needed to pass through to conduct a spacewalk.

Document 14a: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, March 2, 1967. Top Secret Codeword.
Document 14b: Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum to Holders, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-67, The Soviet Space Program, April 4, 1968. Top Secret. 
Sources: Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Editor's Collection
The focus of this estimate was Soviet capabilities and probable accomplishments in space over the following five-to-ten years. Its key sections examine Soviet space launches over the previous two years, scientific and technical factors affecting future prospects, other factors, the near term (1967-1972) outlook, and the longer term outlook. It notes that the Soviets "scored some dramatic 'firsts' since the last Soviet space program estimate" — including the 1965 spacewalk of Alexei Leonov (Document 11), the lunar soft landing of Luna 9, and the lunar orbiting of Luna 10. It also provides additional reasons beyond missile targeting (Document 9) for the Soviet photoreconnaissance program, including mapping areas of general military interest, monitoring the development and testing of U.S. and Chinese military systems, and monitoring large-scale military and naval activity. The memorandum for holders addresses developments in the year since the estimate was released, described by the memorandum as involving "more space launches than in any comparable period since the program began."

Document 15: Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Man in Space Program, March 1, 1968. Classification Not Available.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
This brief report provides an overview of the Soviet man in space program which it notes was "extremely active and aggressive" but "has now slowed perceptibly" — which the report attributes to the need for development of a new Soyuz spacecraft and the death of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov when the braking parachutes designed to return his spacecraft safely malfunctioned.

Document 16a: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-69,The Soviet Space Program , June 19, 1969. Top Secret. 
Document 16b: Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum to Holders, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-69, March 26, 1970. Top Secret. 
Source: Editor's Collection.
The 1969 estimate, the fourth NIE devoted exclusively to the Soviet space program, describes Soviet space launches in the two preceding years; scientific and technical factors affecting future prospects; political and economic factors; and future prospects (with regard to a manned lunar landing; unmanned probes; and a variety of military uses of space — including reconnaissance, early warning and navigation). The section on space launches includes the first discussion in the Soviet space program NIEs of Soviet electronic reconnaissance from space. The memorandum to holders focuses on developments since the publication of the NIE that "directly affected the Soviets' capability to carry out major space ventures" — including the July 3, 1969 explosion of a launch vehicle belonging to a class of vehicles characterized as "essential to any plans the Soviets may have for a manned lunar landing mission."

Document 17: Edward M. Hinman, "The Interpretation of Soviet Press Announcements of "Cosmos" Satellite Launchings," Studies in Intelligence, 13, 3 (Summer 1969). Secret.
Source: Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
In this article, the author discusses how the specifics of Soviet announcements concerning launches of 'Cosmos' satellites can be used to determine the missions of the spacecraft (including, but not limited to photo reconnaissance, recoverable scientific satellites, and meteorological satellites). The author concludes by posing (but not answering) the question as to why Soviets "have clung to formulae which ... are after all not very secure."

Document 18: Director of Central Intelligence National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-71, The Soviet Space Program, July 1, 1971. Top Secret.
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
This NIE follows the format of the earlier Soviet space program NIEs, with chapters on space activity during the previous two years, political and economic factors affecting future prospects, scientific and technical factors, and future prospects. An additional chapter focuses on two aspects of international space cooperation — cooperation between the USSR and European nations, and between the USSR and the United States. Its key judgment section observes that "the Soviets doggedly continue to propagandize their space ventures in an effort to improve their image."

Document 19: Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, Soviet Space Events in 1972, May 1973. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
After a brief discussion of Soviet space activity (divided into 15 categories) in 1972this report devotes a page to each launch during 1972 — providing details such as designation, launch site, mission, accomplishments, recovery (if any), launch vehicle, and orbital elements. 

Document 20: National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-73, Soviet Space Programs, December 20, 1973. Secret.
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
In contrast to earlier estimates in this series, this one contains chapters on the general rationale and emphasis of Soviet space programs, programs in support of strategic objectives, economic applications, prestige programs, and future priorities. With regard to reconnaissance programs, it notes that "Soviet ELINT satellites are more clearly understood than in previous years" and reports on Soviet testing of a radar reconnaissance satellite for ocean surveillance purposes.

Document 21: [Author's Name Deleted], "Stonehouse: First U.S. collector of [deleted] signals," Cryptologic Spectrum 5, 4 (Fall 1975).
Source: www.nsa.gov.
This article, in a National Security Agency journal, describes the history and employment of the Ethiopia-based STONEHOUSE intercept facility, which operated from 1965 to 1975. Its targets included the Luna 9 and other Soviet space missions.4

Document 22: Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Soviet Dependence on Space Systems, November 1975. Top Secret Codeword.
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act Release.
In contrast to the NIEs on the Soviet space program, this memorandum does not concern lunar or space probe activity but focuses largely on the importance of key military space systems — including reconnaissance/surveillance, communications, and other systems. It explores the tasks satellite systems support, assesses Soviet dependence on those systems as well as the degradation of Soviet capabilities if the system were not available. In addition, it examines Soviet defense of their space systems and the prospects for their interfering with US systems.

Document 23: Defense Intelligence Agency, "USSR - Angola: Satellite Photographic Coverage," Defense Intelligence Notice, November 14, 1975. Top Secret Codeword.
Source: Defense Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act Release.
This document reports on the operations of a Soviet photographic reconnaissance satellite, Cosmos 779, directed against targets in Angola. It indicates that the U.S. was able, not only to monitor the launch, deployment, and movements of Soviet photographic satellites, but also to determine which specific targets were photographed.

Document 24: [Author's Name Deleted], "Spacecraft Television from Laika to Gagarin," NSA Technical Journal , XXI, 2 (Spring 1976). 
Source: www.nsa.gov.
This heavily-redacted article focuses on the attempt to develop a means of detecting whether a Soviet space launch included a human passenger. According to the synopsis, the article is intended to be "the story of the race to provide the capability through the exploitation of a unique SIGINT source."

Document 25: Gus W. Weiss, "The Life and Death of Cosmos 954," Studies in Intelligence22, 1 (Spring 1978). Secret. 
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
Cosmos 954, a Soviet radar ocean reconnaissance, crashed into an uninhabited area in Canada's Northwest Territories in January 1978. This article provides an account of the U.S. effort in monitoring its movements before the crash as well as in dealing with the aftermath.5

Document 26: R. L. Landingham and A.W. Casey, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Morning Light Cleanup and Recovery Operation: Simulation Studies of Possible Reactor Fuels, August 31, 1978.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This technical analysis followed recovery of elements of the Cosmos 954 spacecraft (Document 25) and focuses on the fuel employed by the spacecraft's reactor.

Document 27: Foreign Technology Division, Air Force Systems Command, Executive Summary: Forecast of Soviet Directed Energy ASAT Systems, 1978-1998, December 15, 1978. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This briefing begins with the conclusion that "The Soviets have demonstrated a well funded directed energy (DE) program and it is probable that ASAT [anti-satellite] applications will be among the earliest missions considered." It goes on to examine the Soviet directed energy ASAT system capability, Soviet directed energy ASAT technology capabilities, and satellite damage and vulnerability from laser or neutral particle beams.

Document 28: James D. Burke, "The Missing Link," Studies in Intelligence, 22 (Winter 1978). Secret.
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
The author of this article reports that "for nearly sixteen years the Soviet Union has been using a deep-space radio link that we have been unable to intercept" and describes his article as an account of U.S. intelligence efforts that led to a conviction that the link existed, knowledge of other aspects of the Soviet planetary program, and "a determined but still unsuccessful effort to find the unknown signal." Topics covered in the article include deep-space information systems, Soviet deep-space communications, early U.S. deep-space collection efforts (including the STONEHOUSE facility described in Document 21), clues, and the future.

Document 29: National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Salyut-6 Scientific Space Station : The First Manned Phase - September 1977-March 1978, August 1979. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
The Salyut-6 is described in this study as the Soviet Union's "most ambitious manned space endeavor to date." The study examines command-and-control and mission support, provides a physical description of the space station and resupply vehicle, describes significant experiments and equipment, and concludes with a discussion of significant trends and developments. Material deleted from the concluding section may concern the station's possible use for military and intelligence missions.

Document 30: H.D. Wagoner, National Security Agency, Space Surveillance SIGINT Program, 1980. Secret.
Source: NSA Freedom of Information Act Release.
This NSA history examines the use of signals intelligence to monitor Soviet space activities. It covers the background of the program, NSA's planning and organizing to perform the space surveillance SIGINT mission, constructing and equipping the stations (including the STONEHOUSE facility), and the "completion and certain lessons of experience."

Document 31: National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency,Basic Imagery Interpretation Report, Activity and Developments at Selected Soviet Space Research Institutes, February 1980. Secret. 
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
Relying primarily on imagery obtained by U.S. photographic reconnaissance satellites, with some additional information apparently provided by signals intelligence, the report describes recent developments at six Soviet space-related research institutes.

Document 32: National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, The Soviet Earth Resources Satellite Program, June 1980. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This report is an assessment of the Soviet earth resources satellite program. It examines the manned and unmanned photographic programs, the unmanned multispectral scanner program, the ocean remote sensing program, and issues of international data sharing. Included is a comparison of the capability and applications of the Soviet and U.S. programs.

Document 33: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-80, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Space, August 1980. Top Secret.
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
This NIE is more detailed than earlier NIEs on Soviet space programs and, as its title indicates, focuses exclusively on military issues - leaving aside treatment of scientific satellites, lunar-related space activities, or interplanetary probes. Following an overview, the estimate examines existing and prospective military support space systems, existing and prospective uses of space systems for intelligence and military support, and existing and prospective use of space systems to negate those of other nations.

Document 34: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Psychological Research in Support of Soviet Long-Duration Manned Spaceflight, August 1982. Secret.
Source: CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
This study notes that early Soviet manned spaceflights were "almost entirely automated and demanded little of the cosmonauts" but that Soviet manned spaceflights had become longer and more demanding on cosmonauts, and resulted in extensive psychological research to enhance the ability of cosmonauts to satisfy those demands. Topics covered in this study include psychological criteria for selection of cosmonauts, psychological preparation for spaceflight, techniques for monitoring the condition of cosmonauts in flights, as well as sensory, cognitive, psychomotor, and psychological alterations during spaceflight.

Document 35: Directorate of Intelligence, Outlook for Rapid Expansion of Soviet Space Programs Through 1986, October 1982. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This CIA analysis noted that the Soviets were undertaking a variety of new space programs that would result "in a rapid expansion such as that observed during the 1960s but that will cost considerably more." The heavily-redacted analysis goes on to explore the outlook with regard to space launch vehicles, planetary probes, manned missions, synchronous communications satellites and military support satellites, as well as examining resource implications.

Document 36: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions for Permanently Manned Space Stations, November 1982. Top Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
The primary key judgment of this assessment — based both on Soviet public statements and intelligence information — is that the Soviets were committed to permanently orbiting, continuously manned, multipurpose space stations. The body of the assessment provides a description of current and past Soviet space stations, cosmonaut training facilities, command-and-control capabilities, space launch facilities, the projected capability for the 1980s, the projected capability for the 1990s and beyond, and Soviet intentions with regard to military, political, economic and scientific applications.

Document 37: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Key Conclusions About Present and Future Soviet Space Missions, June 1983. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This reference aid covers ten different Soviet space missions (one of whose identities is redacted entirely from the released version). It specifies each mission, the current satellite systems and their capabilities, and future systems.

Document 38a: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-83, The Soviet Space Program - Key Judgments and Summary, July 19, 1983. Top Secret.
Document 38b: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-83, The Soviet Space Program, July 19, 1983. Top Secret. 
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
The key judgments of this estimate (Document 38a) include the observation that "the most significant result of the increased [Soviet] effort in space will be the extension of the Soviet military reach by providing global support to military operations." The 95-page estimate (Document 38b) discusses Soviet views of space, the Soviet effort in space, Soviet space systems in peacetime and wartime, manned space activities, lunar and planetary exploration, and international cooperation. It identifies possible new Soviet space capabilities in the 1980s and 1990s — including deployment of an electro-optical imagery satellite and a geosynchronous launch detection satellite — and the degree of confidence in the estimated date of prototype testing. It also examines a variety of space- and ground-based methods of interfering with U.S. satellites in wartime. 

Document 39: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Satellite Defense Against the US Miniature Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon, September 1983. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This assessment concludes that "the Soviets will have only a limited capability to defend their satellites against an attack by the air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV), the US antisatellite (ASAT) system that is scheduled to be deployed in 1987." As a result, the U.S. ASAT weapon would be "capable of attacking low-altitude satellites, including most of the Soviet reconnaissance satellites." The body of the assessment describes the planned U.S. system (which was never deployed), Soviet knowledge of the system, Soviet warning and countermeasures command, and possible countermeasures (with the identification of and text concerning having been deleted in a number of cases).

Document 40: James D. Burke, "The Missing Link Revealed," Studies in Intelligence, Spring 1984. Secret.
Source: CIA Freedom of Information Act Release.
The author of this article reports that on November 9, 1983, "a 21-year old intelligence problem" - described in the author's 1978 article (Document 28) was solved. "[T]wo Soviet spacecraft in orbit about the planet Venus on that day began transmitting at five-centimeter wavelength and for the first time we intercepted the signal." The article, with significant redactions, picks up the story from the earlier article - discussing the nature of the search, intelligence priorities, the impact of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, the 1983 Soviet mission to Venus, and an "epiphany" and aftermath (almost entirely redacted).

Document 41: Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Military Employment of Space, November 12, 1985. Secret.
Source: DIA Freedom of Information Act Release.
This study, prepared for DIA by the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command (see Document 27), focuses on Soviet intentions in space, Soviet space system military employment, illustrative exercises and crises, the Soviet space order of battle, future
Soviet space systems military employment, utility and dependency, current Soviet spacecraft operational capabilities, and Soviet space launch vehicle operational capabilities. The main focus of the section is on the employment of space systems to support different components of the Soviet military (e.g. the Supreme High Command, the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, or the Strategic Rocket Forces).

Document 42: Director of Central Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-85J, Soviet Space Programs, Volume I - Key Judgments and Executive Summary , December 1983. Top Secret. 
Source: Record Group 263, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park.
Among the key developments (since the 1983 NIE on Soviet space programs) identified in this document are an expanded satellite network (with over 140 operational satellites), new capabilities (including a prototype near-real-time imaging system), improved readiness posture, timeliness of their space-based reconnaissance efforts, survivability, and long-duration manned spaceflight.

Document 43: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, USSR: Military and Space Systems in Development - Improving Capabilities for the 1990s, August 1986. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This report was produced to provide an overview of the Soviet effort to develop new and modernized military space systems. It asserted that as of January 1, 1986, "the Soviets have at least 123 military systems in development, most of which will achieve initial operational capability by the mid-1990s." The bulk of the paper focuses on the Soviet military capabilities that would be supported by space activities, with a final section on military applications of space.

Document 44: Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Scientific Space Program: Gaining Prestige, January 1988. Secret. 
Source: www.foia.cia.gov 
This research paper examines four projected future Soviet scientific space missions — astronomy, lunar and planetary, solar-terrestrial physics, and biomedical — and their role in gaining international prestige for the Soviet scientific space program.

Document 45: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Reusable Space Systems Program: Implications for Space Operations in the 1990s, September 1988. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
This assessment focuses on two reusable space systems and their prospects — a space shuttle and a spaceplane. For both systems, the assessment, inter alia, examines their possible role in military operations. It judged that a space shuttle's "lack of orbital maneuverability and the time required for prelaunch checkout [would] limit its usefulness for most potential intelligence collection and combat missions." In contrast, "a spaceplane's maneuvering capability, both in space and in the atmosphere, could provide the Soviet Air Force with a highly maneuverable, manned spacecraft to conduct military operations." It could serve as a "rapid reaction reconnaissance vehicle."

Document 46: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Options for a Manned Mars Landing Mission, September 1989. Secret.
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
A key judgment of this assessment was that "the Soviets are planning for a manned Mars landing mission sometime after the year 2000" — although the mission had not been officially funded. The assessment went on to examine planning for a manned Mars mission, manned Mars mission requirements, Soviet investment, cooperation with the United States on a Mars mission, and future indicators of such a Soviet mission.

Document 47: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Commercial Space Photography: Offering Resolution as the Solution, June 1990. Secret.
Source: Editor's Collection.
During the early years of its space reconnaissance program, the Soviet Union attempted (unsuccessfully) to hide its reconnaissance satellite launches under the all-purpose 'Cosmos' designation (Document 17). By contrast, during the final years of its existence, the Soviet Union began "aggressively marketing satellite imagery of the Earth," selling images produced by some of the photographic reconnaissance satellites operated by the GRU (military intelligence) — which meant, that at the time, it was offering the highest spatial resolution images commercially available. This research paper examines the Soviet systems providing photography for sale, expansion of the Soviet product line, other Soviet imaging systems with commercial potential, future sensors and platforms, marketing policy, the USSR's viability as a contender in the market, and implications for the United States. 

Document 48: Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Assessment of Soviet Space Transportation Technology, April 5, 1991. Secret .
Source: www.foia.cia.gov
This assessment notes that "the primary strength of the Soviet space program is its space transportation systems" and that as a result of its deteriorating economic situation "there is enormous incentive for the Soviets to sell existing systems to the West and seek Western partners for jointly developing future systems." It goes on to examine Soviet capabilities with regard to seven different components of space transportation technology.

Document 49: Robert J. Hanyok, "The Longest Search: The Story of the Twenty-One Year Pursuit of the Soviet Deep-Space Link, and How It Was Helped by the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence," Cryptologic Almanac, 50th Anniversary Series, April - June 2003. Secret/Comint.
Source: www.governmentattic.org.
This article provides more detail than the Studies in Intelligence account (Document 40) of the search for the Soviet deep space link signal. It reveals why the five-centimeter signal was so hard to detect, that the CIA employed a former NASA deep space facility (whose location was redacted) to attempt to locate the signal (an effort which failed), the use of a Radio Frequency Interference van employed in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence in locating the signal, and the role of the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC) in coordinating the search for the signal.


NOTES

[1] Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 135; Robert A. Devine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. xiii, xv.
[2] U.S. Intelligence Community collection and analysis regarding the Soviet Union's lunar program can also be found in Jeffrey T. Richelson (ed.), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book # 479, Soldiers, Spies, and the Moon : Secret U.S. and Soviet Plans for the 1950s and 1960s, July 20, 2014. Accounts of U.S. intelligence assessments of various aspects of the Soviet space program include Dwayne A. Day, "From the Shadows to the Stars: James Webb's Use of Intelligence Data in the Race to the Moon," Air Power History, Winter 2004, pp. 30-39; Peter Pesavento, "Lifting the Veil: What US Intelligence Knew in the 1960s about the Soviet Space Program," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society (Space Chronicle) 60, Supplement 2, 2007, pp. 49-87. For a study on NASA's role as a consumer and producer of intelligence on the Soviet space program see James E. David, Spies and Shuttles: NASA's Secret Relationship with the DoD and CIA (Gainesville, Fla.: University Press of Florida, 2015).
[3] Matthew Aid, "Listening to the Soviets in Space," www.matthewaid.com, March 10, 2013; Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service , 1945-1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 216-217.
[4] James Burke, "Seven Years to Luna 9," Studies in Intelligence , 10, 2 (Summer 1986): 1-24; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 2001), p. 85.
[5] On the Cosmos 954 monitoring and clean-up effort, also see Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon: Inside NEST, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), pp. 47-69.

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